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With safety management systems (SMS) occupying an increasingly 
prominent position in the aviation landscape, the ability to benchmark safety 
performance not only against past internal effectiveness but also across similar 
organizations seems a necessary element of one of SMS’s foundational themes: 
continuous improvement. At present, anecdotal evidence, supported by limited 
available research in the field, suggests that few organizations are engaged in 
meaningful evaluation and benchmarking of safety performance through an 
established methodology. This research investigates a method of evaluating an 
organization’s efficiency in creating a robust and positive safety culture using 
efficiency frontier estimation, specifically through data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). 
 
Introduction 
 
Whether as a byproduct of legislative requirement or as a result of corporate 
obligations and responsibility, aviation operators are increasingly implementing 
structured safety systems, many in the form of SMS. One of the “essential” 
elements of an SMS is a “safety culture” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015, 
pp. 3-4). Acknowledging that the notion of safety culture has become widely 
accepted, if not comprehensively defined, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (2013) addresses culture in the context of safety as largely an 
organizational issue that is supported by and manifested in safety reporting 
procedures and practices designed to identify inherent hazards. Safety management 
systems seek to create an environment in which organizations move from mere 
compliance with minimum regulatory requirements to a performance-based 
approach (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009). In a performance-
based safety environment, there must be measurable indicators of the capacity for 
safety beyond lagging indicators such as accident or injury rate. The logical 
inference, consistent with the axiom often attributed to the management consultant 
Peter Drucker: “if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it,” is that safety culture 
should be the subject of consistent evaluation and measurement as part of attempts 
to purposefully manage or shape an organization’s culture. This assertion is 
supported by standards such as those promulgated in the International Standard for 
Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO), ISO 9001:2000 and ISO 9001:2008, and 
AS 9100, all of which contain language referencing the achievement of objectives 
and targets, performance measurement and monitoring, and continual 
improvement; elements which are arguably central to the concept of safety culture.  
  
Despite the apparent requirement for a quantitative means of measuring and 
benchmarking safety culture and performance in aviation organizations, a 
commonly accepted approach does not presently exist. This research addresses this 
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problem by proposing the development of a mathematical model through the use of 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) to provide a quantitative benchmark of efficiency 
in establishing safety culture relative to a set of organizations, or from a single 
organization based on historical data.  
 
This research contributes to the body of knowledge by introducing a 
methodology for assessment of the relative efficiency of organizations in creating 
and maintaining a positive safety culture, and as such, the relative effectiveness of 
safety programs. The results of this study, when applied to operational data, present 
a method to guide organizations in identifying the most appropriate means of 
increasing their efficiency in developing a thriving safety culture. It further forms 
a foundation on which additional investigation of stochastic measurements, such as 
bootstrapped DEA, can be adopted as a measurement system. 
 
Review of Literature 
 
Safety Culture Measurement 
 
Measurement of safety program effectiveness is an onerous task for many 
organizations, not only those in the aviation industry. In the context of safety, 
traditional performance indicators tend toward a focus on forensic data, often 
reporting metrics like accident and incident rate, cost of accidents, insurance 
claims, and lost days due to injury (Arezes & Miguel, 2003). Peterson (2001) argues 
that safety systems should be evaluated based on a multiple-measures approach, 
suggesting that safety programs should be assessed using a minimum of three 
measures: accident record; audit scores, and results from perception surveys. In this 
context, perception surveys are intended to measure the state of an organization’s 
safety culture, an issue which has been the subject of growing attention within the 
aviation community (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell 
Gibbons, 2004). 
 
Understanding safety culture as a science is somewhat of a paradox, given 
that it can act “simultaneously as precondition both for safe operations and for the 
oversight of incubating hazards” (Pidgeon, 1998, p. 205). This observation is 
suggestive of the somewhat abstract status of safety culture as a concept in practice. 
It is generally accepted that safety culture operates as a subset of a larger 
organizational culture in the same context as identified by Zohar (1980), though 
consensus has not necessarily been reached on exactly what the concept is, or on 
why it should be the subject of empirical inquiry (Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg, 
& Martin, 1991). Guldenmund (2010, p.1466) notes that “culture is an intangible, 
fuzzy concept encompassing acquired assumptions that is shared among the 
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members of a group and that provides meaning to their perceptions and actions and 
those of others.”  Schein (2010) generally agrees with Guldenmund’s 
characterization of the concept, despite also suggesting that there is no such thing 
as a safety culture independent of the more significant organizational construct 
(Conklin, 2016). Despite an apparent lack of conceptual specificity, from a practical 
standpoint, the study of safety and its related constructs is of apparent importance.  
 
Beus, Payne, Bergman, and Arthur (2010) cite 2008 U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics figures that indicate in the United States in 2007; there were over 5,600 
work-related fatalities and over four million nonfatal work injuries. In the 
environment of aviation operations and specifically those that occur during ground 
operations, the Flight Safety Foundation (n.d.) estimates that around 27,000 ramp 
accidents occur worldwide each year, with over 243,000 injuries and a total cost of 
at least $10 billion annually. Although they are illustrative as examples of why 
safety endures as an area of intense scrutiny, these figures make no provision for 
attempting to capture the psychological costs or damage to an organization’s 
reputation as the result of an accident (Neal & Griffin, 2002). 
 
Attempts at measuring safety culture have come about in part as a result of 
the realization that the forensic, retrospective measurements that have long 
characterized attempts to assess safety, such as accident or incident rate, injuries, 
or fatalities, provide little support for proactive initiatives (O'Connor, O'Dea, 
Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011). In aviation, as in many industries, actual accident rates 
have fallen to so low a level as to make their analysis as a measure of safety 
performance almost obsolete. In fact, the measurement of such metrics as accident 
rate can be viewed mainly as a reactive response to events that, assuming a 
functional safety system, theoretically occur with decreasing frequency (Keren, 
Mills, Freeman, & Shelley, 2009). It is often difficult to discern, reliant on such low 
base-rate phenomena, whether a lack of injuries or accidents is the result of 
organizational measures designed to reduce hazards, or if the absence of injury is 
merely a reflection of too short a period of observation (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & 
Arthur, 2010). Rather than require that a system reach failure as a means of 
identifying latent faults, the concept of measuring safety culture as a leading 
indicator of organizational safety performance is appealing from a management 
perspective in that it allows the potential for reduction of operational accidents 
through a proactive, and even predictive, approach. 
 
  While it is generally understood at the theoretical level that a positive 
safety culture is an essential element in the prevention of accidents, Wiegmann et 
al. (2004) note that no broadly standardized tools exist that can be used to assess 
safety culture. Reviewing the extant literature on the subject, however, Wiegmann 
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et al. (2004) identify five common themes that serve as indicators of safety culture. 
These indicators include organizational commitment, management involvement, 
employee empowerment, reward systems, and reporting systems. The importance 
of organizational commitment is echoed by Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, and Bryden 
(2000), who identified management behaviors and attitudes as an emergent theme 
in their own research.  Fuller (1997) also addresses organizational commitment as 
being a key indicator of safety performance, though not in an aviation-specific 
occupational health and safety context. In reviewing assessment instruments in the 
UK offshore oil industry, Davies, Spencer, and Dooley (2001) found that of 114 
different questionnaire items, 30 related directly to an organizational and 
managerial commitment to safety. Management involvement, like organizational 
commitment, is also well-supported as an indicator of the health of an 
organization’s safety culture. Choudry, Fang, and Mohamed (2007) assert that 
management commitment to safety initiatives and compliance is central to the very 
definition of safety culture, an observation echoed by Flin et al. (2000). That 
comparison of a different culture or climate assessment tools would indicate a 
preponderance of questions centered about managers’ safety behaviors is not 
surprising, given that supervisors “undoubtedly set the tone and tempo for 
organizational atmosphere” including perceptions regarding safety (Flin et al., 
2000, p. 186).  
 
Employee involvement appears in a number of safety culture instruments 
(Davies, Spencer, & Dooley, 2001; Fuller, 1997) and its importance is stressed by 
Geller (1994), who notes that employees who feel “part of a cohesive group” are 
more likely to act empathetically toward their fellow employees, increasing safety-
compliant behavior (p.21). Reason (1997) speaks to the matter of rewards, 
commenting that rewarding desirable safety behaviors can be a key element of 
creating a just culture, which he argues is a necessary component of a functional 
safety culture. Reward programs, naturally, rely on the consistent use and formal 
documentation; but when these conditions are satisfied, properly designed and 
implemented rewards can positively reinforce safety behaviors and safety culture 
(Wiegmann et al., 2004). Finally, the assertion by Wiegmann et al. (2004) that a 
healthy reporting system is a key indicator of a safety culture is echoed by Reason 
(1997), who notes that the rationale for any reporting system is to identify 
“organizational factors promoting errors and incidents” (p. 198). In summary, clear 
evidence exists within the literature in support of the previously identified 
indicators of safety culture performance. 
 
The body of knowledge of safety culture clearly suggests that the construct 
of safety culture is still developing, with a litany of definitions and tools for 
assessment. However vaguely-specified the concept of culture may be, the evidence 
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overwhelmingly supports its importance as a foundation for positive safety 
performance. The literature is also far from ambiguous in its support of attempts to 
quantify and analyze measures of safety culture as a leading indicator, allowing 
organizations to assess safety performance even in the absence of accidents. Data 
envelopment analysis is one such method for evaluation and analysis of safety 
culture 
 
Use of DEA for Benchmarking 
 
DEA is a robust, nonparametric alternative to regression analysis for 
measuring the efficiency of business operations as compared to an estimated 
production efficiency frontier (El-Mashaleh, Rababeh, & Hyari, 2010; Ray, 2004). 
This frontier is the estimated, but unobserved “geometrical locus of optimal 
production plans” (Simar & Wilson, 1998, p. 49). The estimated technical 
efficiency of any decision-making unit is the ratio of the distance from the origin 
to the unit under evaluation and the distance from the origin to the composite unit 
on the efficiency frontier (Barros & Dieke, 2008). Introduced by Farrell in 1957 
and refined to form the techniques which serve as the basis for this research by 
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes in a 1978 article, DEA was proposed as a means of 
objectively evaluating the efficiency of each participating decision-making unit 
(DMU) in a public program. In its original form (hereafter referred to as the CCR 
model after Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes), DEA was limited by an assumption of 
constant returns to scale; that is, outputs change proportionately to a change in all 
inputs (Charnes et al., 1978). Following up on their earlier model, Banker, Charnes, 
and Cooper (1984) introduced a more refined set of variables to the DEA ratio that 
allowed for variable returns to scale, accommodating contestable market theory 
rather than a simple, single output economic model.  
 
The ability of the Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC) model to 
accommodate reallocation of resources to more attractive or more profitable 
activities allows for the possibility that resources available within many safety 
systems are dynamic and may be apportioned as such. For this research, however; 
the inability of the BCC model to accommodate inefficiencies beyond those 
attributed to technical or managerial elements makes it an inappropriate technique 
as compared to the CCR model, which includes estimation of scale efficiencies, 
combining estimates into a single value while assuming constant returns to scale 
(Barros & Dieke, 2008). As opposed to methods such as stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA), DEA was chosen in this study because, unlike in SFA, it requires neither a 
large sample size nor that the functional form for estimation of cost or production 
technologies be pre-specified, a characteristic that limits flexibility and makes SFA 
ill-suited to the research at hand (Assaf & Josiassen, 2011).  
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 El-Mashaleh, Rababeh, and Hyari (2010) undertook a study to benchmark 
the safety performance of construction contractors in Jordan. The El-Mashaleh et 
al. (2010) benchmarking study sought to compare the efficiency of utilization of 
safety-related expenses with safety expenses as a percent of total revenue as input 
variables and accident count as output variables. The authors acknowledge a 
limitation of their technique implicitly by suggesting a separate analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) be utilized to further examine differences between contractors. This 
study demonstrates that safety performance can be benchmarked against 
homogenous operators as well as internal measures evaluated over time through the 
use of DEA. In a similar vein, Beriha, Patnaik, and Mahapatra (2011) studied the 
applicability of DEA as a tool for the evaluation of safety performance in Indian 
organizations in the construction and manufacturing sectors.  
 
The use of DEA in production and technical efficiency estimation is due in 
large part to its ability to compare DMUs directly to peer organizations while 
avoiding the many assumptions inherent in similar techniques such as stochastic 
frontier analysis (Ray, 2004). Adding to the applicability of DEA as a tool for safety 
benchmarking is that inputs need not be expressed as homogenous units; a trait that 
is particularly appropriate given that influences of safety performance may occur 
across varying levels of measurement. Despite its apparent applicability to 
benchmarking, DEA is not without its limitations. First, because it is an extreme 
point technique, DEA is particularly susceptible to measurement and sampling 
errors (Simar & Wilson, 1998). Second, DEA as a method is only concerned with 
performance relative to the sample. If for instance, none of the subject organizations 
is efficient relative to a theoretical maximum value, DEA will only reflect relative 
efficiency and not the gap between reality and how well an organization could 
ideally be performing. Finally, and of particular interest in this study, DEA is 
considered a nonparametric, or deterministic, technique. As such, it does not 
produce standard errors and makes hypothesis testing extremely difficult (Ray, 
2004; Simar & Wilson, 1998). With this in mind, the present study was designed 
as a first step toward demonstrating the applicability of DEA to safety culture 
benchmarking in aviation, with the secondary goal of illustrating the need, along 
with suggestions for future directions, for expansions to native DEA techniques that 
allow stochastic efficiency measures. 
 
Method 
 
This research assumed a two-phase approach for model development. In the 
first phase, a native, nonparametric DEA model was developed and tested. In the 
second phase, the primary, native DEA model was used as a basis for the limited 
expansion of the model into stochastic, double-bootstrapped DEA form. In this 
6
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 4 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 9
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss4/9
  
study, each organization whose measurement data are used as input information for 
DEA was considered a DMU. In a parallel use of the model, it is possible for an 
individual organization to self-audit and track performance at regular intervals 
considering each measurement taken over time as a separate DMU. In order to 
avoid inconsistencies in the measurement of production output, in this case, the 
previously-discussed indicators of safety culture, this study proposes to use a single 
conventional cultural measurement instrument for all DMUs. For the purposes of 
this research, the cultural survey described and implemented by von Thaden, 
Wiegmann, Mitchell, Sharma, and Zhang (2003) has been identified for its 
harmony with the five aforementioned cultural traits. To ensure that input and 
output variables are correctly identified as well as relevant to the intended 
efficiency estimate, the methodology outlined by Simar and Wilson (2001) was 
employed. 
 
Variables in a DEA model represent the conversion of inputs, such as 
resources or investment, into outputs, such as specific performance measures by the 
DMUs under study (El-Mashaleh, Rababeh, & Hyari, 2010). In the context of the 
present research, input and output variables are different from those that typify 
DEA models which aim to estimate financial or production efficiency. In early 
stages of this research, a number of variables for potential inclusion in the model 
were identified, including: annual safety budget (per capita or as a percentage of 
total budget); normalized lost-time injuries; normalized aircraft incidents; 
normalized hazard report submissions; mean-time-to-resolution of hazard reports; 
count of overdue hazard resolutions; workers’ compensation experience modifier; 
aircraft and general liability insurance loss ratio; and standardized scores derived 
from the selected cultural measurement instrument or its subsections. While the 
inclusion of many input or output variables could arguably increase the fidelity of 
the measurement, one limitation of DEA in this regard is the tendency for the 
number of variables to be too great relative to the sample size (Ray, 2005).  
 
To alleviate this concern, variables were checked in accordance with the 
methods proposed by Jenkins and Anderson (2003) for confirmation of input or 
output status and were aggregated to the extent practicable. The simplified output 
variable is the composite score of the von Thaden et al. (2003) cultural 
measurement instrument previously discussed. Input variables were limited to 
include measures selected to represent three facets of investment: capital, 
personnel, and leadership. Each of these variables relates back to the factors 
addressed by von Thaden et al. (2003). Table 1 summarizes the variable definitions 
and assumptions used in the context of this research. 
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Table 1 
Variable Descriptions and Measures 
 
Variable Input/ 
Output 
Description Measure 
Percent of total 
annual expenses 
spent on safety 
Input Measures the financial 
commitment of the 
organization to safety. The 
higher the metric, the 
higher the share of its 
expenses that an 
organization devotes to 
safety; and thus, the higher 
the financial commitment 
to safety. Computed as the 
ratio of annual expense on 
safety to the total expenses 
of the organization.  
Generally, the metric will 
be computed from actual 
annual expenditures. 
However, it may also be 
computed from budgeted 
annual expenses. 
% FTEs 
dedicated to 
safety positions 
Input This metric measures the 
human resource 
commitment of the 
organization to safety. The 
higher the metric, the 
higher the share of total 
workforce that an 
organization devotes to 
safety and thus, the higher 
the human resource 
commitment to safety. 
Computed as the ratio of 
the total full-time 
equivalents (FTE) 
dedicated to safety to the 
total FTEs of the 
organization.  
The use of FTE accounts 
for resources partially 
dedicated to safety, such 
as a pilot who in addition 
to flying duties also 
serves for 10% of work 
time on the union’s safety 
committee. Such a 
resource would be 
counted as .1 of an FTE 
dedicated to safety. The 
metric can be computed 
for any given point in 
time (snapshot), or 
averaged over a period of 
time. 
Mean hours of 
safety training 
per 
employee/year 
Input Measures the training 
commitment of the 
organization to safety. The 
higher the metric, the more 
safety training employees 
receive on average. 
Computed as total hours 
of safety training received 
by employees in the 
organization during a 
year divided by the 
average total number of 
employees in the 
organization during that 
year. 
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Variable Input/ 
Output 
Description Measure 
Safety 
prominence in 
leadership 
communication 
Input This metric measures the 
organization’s top 
leadership commitment to 
safety. The higher the 
metric, the more prominent 
safety is in top leadership 
communication. 
Computed by scoring 
each top leadership 
message to employees for 
the prominence of safety, 
and averaging the scores 
over leadership messages 
sent that year. Scoring is 
based on the following 
point system: 0 for no 
mention of safety; 1 for 
single-line mention of 
safety (e.g., "Work safe 
and take care of each 
other), 2 for dedicating 
one paragraph to safety, 3 
for dedicating more than 
one paragraph but not the 
entire message to safety, 
and 4 for dedicating the 
whole message to safety. 
Safety culture Output von Thaden et al. (2003) 
culture assessment 
instrument. 
Composite safety culture 
survey score. 
 
 
The methodology proposed in this study has a strong foundation in the CCR 
model previously discussed, and it follows the linear programming model also used 
by Beriha, Patnaik, and Mahapatra (2011). This model, adapted from Charnes, 
Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), is a maximization of the ratio of weighted outputs to 
weighted inputs subject to the constraint that the equivalent ratios for every 
decision-making unit (DMU) are equal to or less than unity (p. 430). The input and 
outputs variables are represented by yrj and xij and the variable weights determined 
by the solution are represented as ur and vi. This model is the basic foundation of 
DEA, and it aggregates measures of efficiency into a single value. There are two 
ways to state the ratio in the “ratio-form” or DEA model of technical efficiency 
(Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2011). In the output-oriented form, the ratio considered 
is the ratio of outputs to inputs, where a higher ratio corresponds to higher 
efficiency. In the input-oriented form, the ratio considered is the reciprocal ratio, 
namely the ratio of inputs to outputs. In this case, a lower ratio corresponds to 
higher efficiency. For this research, the output-oriented CCR model was chosen as 
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a means of efficiency comparisons along a frontier based upon best practices or 
optimal implementation of cultural interventions.  
 
The Beriha et al. model (2011) is a functional one and is nearly identical to 
the original CCR formulation. In the context of this study, the model is formulated 
in virtually the same arrangement, though written in ratio form as in Equation 1.  
 
max ℎ𝑒(𝑢, 𝑣) = ∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑒
𝑟∈𝑅
/ ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑒
𝑖∈𝐼
 
    s.t.:       
 (1) 
∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑑
𝑟∈𝑅
/ ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑑
𝑖∈𝐼
≤ 1 ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 
𝑢𝑟 ≥ 0 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 
Where:  he is the objective function and represents the efficiency of DMU e 
which is evaluated, 
  ur is a decision variable and represents the weight of output r, 
  vi is a decision variable and represents the weight of input i, 
  yrd is the observed value of output r for DMU d, 
  xid is the observed value of input i for DMU d, 
  R is the set of all outputs, 
  I is the set of all inputs, and 
D is the set of all DMUs. 
 
To select a unique solution, the CCR model is transformed into a linear 
programming problem using the transformation by Charnes and Cooper (1962), 
which selects the representative solution in which the weighted sum of inputs 
equals unity. Equation 2 shows the resulting linear programming problem for the 
output-oriented CCR model. 
 
max 𝐸𝑒(𝜇) = ∑ 𝜇𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑒
𝑟∈𝑅
 
    s.t.:       
 (2) 
∑ 𝜇𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑑
𝑟∈𝑅
− ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑑
𝑖∈𝐼
≤ 0 ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑒
𝑖∈𝐼
= 1 
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𝜇𝑟 ≥ 0 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 
Where:  Ee is the objective function and represents the efficiency of DMU e 
which is evaluated, 
 µr is a decision variable and represents the weight of output r, 
 vi is a decision variable and represents the weight of input i, 
 yrd is the observed value of output r for DMU d, 
 xid is the observed value of input i for DMU d, 
 R is the set of all outputs, 
 I is the set of all inputs, and 
 D is the set of all DMUs. 
 
 This linear programming model maximizes the sum of weighted outputs of 
the DMU that is being evaluated. The first constraint ensures that for each DMU 
the sum of weighted output is smaller or equal than the sum of weighted inputs. 
Through this constraint, a relationship between inputs and outputs is enforced. The 
second constraint ensures that the sum of weighted input for the DMU that is being 
evaluated is equal to one. Through this constraint, the uniqueness of a solution with 
maximum technical efficiency scores of one is enforced. The final two constraints 
ensure that the weights are non-negative. 
 
 The linear programming model shown in Equation 2 needs to be solved 
once for each DMU. To enable simpler processing of the model for the complete 
set of DMUs in commercial solver software, the researcher extended the model into 
a form in which the efficiency of all DMUs can be solved within one model run. 
Equation 3 shows the extended model. 
 
max ∑  𝐸𝑒(𝜇)
𝑒∈𝐷
= ∑ ∑ 𝜇𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑟𝑒
𝑟∈𝑅𝑒∈𝐷
 
    s.t.:       
 (3) 
∑ 𝜇𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑟𝑑
𝑟∈𝑅
− ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑑
𝑖∈𝐼
≤ 0      ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑒 ∈ 𝐷 
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑒
𝑖∈𝐼
= 1       ∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐷 
𝜇𝑟𝑒 ≥ 0             ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑒 ∈ 𝐷 
𝑣𝑖𝑒 ≥ 0         ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑒 ∈ 𝐷 
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Where:  Ee is the objective function and represents the efficiency of DMU e 
which is evaluated, 
µre is a decision variable and represents the weight of output r for the 
evaluation of DMU e, 
vie is a decision variable and represents the weight of input i for the 
evaluation of DMU e, 
 yrd is the observed value of output r for DMU d, 
 xid is the observed value of input i for DMU d, 
 R is the set of all outputs, 
 I is the set of all inputs, and 
 D is the set of all DMUs. 
 
This linear programming model maximizes the sum of weighted outputs of 
all DMUs rather than just one. The constraints are similar as in Equation 2, with 
the difference that they now apply for all DMUs rather than for just the one DMU 
that is being evaluated. As such, the number of constraints increases as a multiple 
of the number of DMUs in the set. Once populated with input data, the model was 
computed within the software program LINGO, version 13.0.   
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Because of limitations on the accessibility of safety culture survey data as 
well as direct measurement data for the proposed model variables, the model was 
tested using randomized, contrived data. The nature of the cultural measurement 
instrument suggested for use in this model made it incompatible with the timeframe 
imposed upon this study. As such results are limited by their ability to inform 
generalizable conclusions. Yet these remain useful as a means of testing the model 
as an incremental step toward demonstrating the applicability of DEA as a safety 
culture benchmarking tool. 
 
Simulated Data and Testing 
 
To test the model in the absence of real experimental data, an artificial set 
of test data were developed. Testing was completed in three phases. In the first 
phase, artificial test data were evaluated both through the researcher’s algorithm 
and a step-by-step manual computation based on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to 
ensure proper functioning of the algorithm. Data for five organizations were 
purposively synthesized with apparent differences in the input and output values, 
and the results from both the researcher’s algorithm and the step-by-step 
computation were compared for consistency in results, shown in Table 3. In the 
second phase, test cases of artificial data with known efficiency ranking between 
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organizations were created and evaluated in the model to ensure the model would 
provide the correct ranking of efficiency. Finally, testing of the model was 
completed using random, simulated data. In this way, the model was both verified 
to ensure computational accuracy and validated to demonstrate that performance 
was as expected given both purposive and random input selection. A primary 
limitation to testing of the model is that the literature indicates that no analog 
measures to the proposed model currently exist. As such, this study takes on some 
exploratory characteristics. Rather than attempt comparison of model results to an 
established measure, testing of the model was limited to simulated data and 
evaluation of whether the results were logically supported by input data. 
Descriptive statistics of data used in the first phase of testing are presented in Table 
2. Excel computation of the DEA problem resulted in the scores for each of the five 
phase one test organizations as given in Table 3. 
 
Table 2 
Test Phase 1 Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
% of budget 0.87 0.57 0.35 1.80 
% of FTEs 1.41 0.63 0.75 2.30 
Hours of annual training 19.40 7.47 12.00 30.00 
Top leadership message score 1.48 0.43 1.00 2.10 
Safety score 4.32 1.37 2.80 6.30 
 
 
Table 3 
DEA Efficiency Estimates for Phase 1 Testing 
 
Organization DEA Estimate 
A 1.00 
B 1.00 
C 0.98 
D 1.00 
E 1.00 
 
 
The test data were evaluated in the researcher’s algorithm for the DEA 
model. The results from the authors’ algorithm were consistent with those from the 
step-by-step manual computation, providing an initial verification of the accuracy 
of the researcher’s algorithm. For second phase testing, artificial data for test DMUs 
were created. Table 4 shows the artificial test data. Table 5 shows the relative 
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efficiency expected from the DEA for this test set of data, as well as the efficiencies 
computed from DEA. This test verified that for predictable situations, that 
researcher’s algorithm provides accurate, logical efficiency rankings. 
 
The third phase, randomized test dataset included data for the four input 
variables and the one output variable for 14 organizations. The number of test 
organizations was limited to 14 due to an a priori testing constraint limit of 250, 
and 14 organizations with 4 inputs and 1 output resulted in 225 constraints. The 
input data were generated by choosing at random from a normal distribution, with 
lower-bound truncation at zero for values that fell below zero for all variables, 
upper-bound truncation at 75 for percentage input values, and upper-bound 
truncation for top leadership message at 4. The parameters of the normal 
distribution are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 4 
Phase 2 Test Data  
 
Inputs  Output 
Org. % 
Budget 
% 
FTEs 
Training 
Hours 
Leadership 
Messages 
 Safety 
Culture  
 
A 1 1 1 1  7  
B 0 0 15 0  3  
C 0 0 30 0  3  
D 0 0 60 0  6  
E 0 0 45 0  3  
 
 For each of the 14 test organizations, a value for the output variable safety 
culture score was generated based on the four input variables of each organization 
and a random noise. Equation 4 describes the formula used to generate the safety 
culture score. 
 
 [safety culture] =  7 – 7 / (1 + .6 * [% of budget]  
   + .4 * [% of FTEs]    
 (4) 
   + .02 [training hours] 
   + .4 [leadership message]) 
   + ε  
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Table 5 
Expected and Actual Efficiency Ranking 
 
Expected  DEA evaluation 
Org. Rank Rationale  Efficiency Rank 
A 1 Highest possible outcome with lowest 
possible inputs ensures this organization 
lies on the frontier 
 1.00 1 
B 1 Highest possible outcome to input ratio 
with only training input, ensures this 
organization lies on the frontier as input 
mix different than A 
 1.00 1 
C 3 Second highest possible outcome to input 
ratio with only training input 
 .50 3 
D 3 Linear multiple (2x) of C for both inputs 
and outputs 
 .50 3 
E 5 Lowest possible outcome to input ratio 
with only training input 
 .33 5 
 
Table 6 
Phase 3 Input Variable Parameters 
 
Input variable Mean Standard Deviation 
% of budget 1.0 .5 
% of FTEs 2 .75 
Hours of annual training 32 6 
Top leadership message score 1.75 .5 
 
 
This equation was developed to ensure that safety culture increases with increasing 
values for the input variable and that the mean safety culture score was 5.1, 
consistent with prior research validating the selected measurement instrument 
(Wiegmann, von Thaden, Mitchell, Sharma, & Zhang, 2003). Each input variable 
value range was developed by researcher consensus based on anecdotal experience. 
The random noise ε, which is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with zero 
mean and standard deviation 0.3, ensured that efficiencies varied between different 
organizations. To ensure the safety score values were valid on the scale of the 
variable, the values were truncated at a lower bound of 1 and an upper bound of 7. 
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the test data. The full test data is 
reproduced in Table 8. The safety score mean of 4.83 is about .5 standard deviations 
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lower than the design target of 5.1. This difference is due to sampling, and these 
data were found to be suitable for testing of the model. 
 
Figure 1 shows a plot of the relative technical efficiency scores compared 
to safety culture for the 14 test organizations. It is important to note that some of 
the relatively most efficient organizations have relatively low safety culture scores. 
Organization G has the overall lowest safety culture score of 3.93. However, it is 
also among the efficient organizations. This shows that organization G is able to 
efficiently use very few inputs and still achieve a safety culture score of 3.93. 
 
Table 7 
Phase 3 Test Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
% of budget 1.19 0.50 0.30 1.98 
% of FTEs 1.79 0.50 0.88 2.40 
Hours of annual training 23.32 5.72 13.52 32.48 
Top leadership message score 1.61 0.39 1.11 2.23 
Safety score 5.13 0.71 3.93 6.21 
 
 
Table 8 
Phase 3 Test Data  
 
 Inputs  Output 
Org. % 
budget 
% 
FTEs 
Trng. 
hours 
Leadership 
msg. 
 Safety 
Culture  
Efficiency 
A 0.81 2.00 24.69 2.09  5.51 0.76 
B 1.27 2.18 28.54 1.35  4.35 0.68 
C 1.57 1.49 21.11 2.09  5.37 0.87 
D 1.76 1.97 25.20 1.83  5.97 0.84 
E 1.71 1.31 24.36 1.40  5.83 1.00 
F 1.98 2.40 19.67 1.44  4.37 0.74 
G 0.30 0.89 13.78 1.18  3.93 1.00 
H 0.50 2.26 19.35 1.11  4.53 1.00 
I 1.32 2.18 13.52 1.57  5.67 1.00 
J 1.13 2.05 31.54 1.16  6.21 1.00 
K 1.14 0.88 26.66 1.32  4.76 1.00 
L 0.76 1.36 32.48 2.04  5.25 0.84 
M 0.80 2.08 24.69 2.23  5.49 0.73 
N 1.55 1.96 20.94 1.68  4.54 0.71 
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Figure 1. Relative technical efficiency scores versus safety culture. 
 
 
Bootstrapped DEA 
 
As discussed earlier, one of the primary limitations of DEA is that it is an 
inherently deterministic model, and it does not make allowances for measurement 
error in the derivation of efficiency scores. As an extension of the technique 
previously outlined, bootstrapping allows for the flexibility of DEA to be 
maintained while allowing for statistical properties of efficiency estimates to be 
determined. Bootstrapping in the context of DEA was introduced by Simar and 
Wilson in 1998 based on earlier work introducing the bootstrap by Efron in 1979; 
and it has since been refined to represent an established technique, as is described 
in their 2007 article. At its core, bootstrapping is a technique based on the idea of 
repeated simulation of the data-generating process (DGP) (Simar & Wilson, 1998). 
Bootstrapping repeatedly resamples the original estimator in order to mimic the 
sampling distribution missing from deterministic methods. Because the asymptotic 
distribution in DEA is not only difficult to determine, but also prone to error, 
bootstrapping is used to estimate the sample properties without the need for fully 
specifying the DGP (the sample serves as the population from which estimates are 
treated as valid samples).  In their seminal 2007 work, Simar and Wilson describe 
the advantages of their bootstrapping strategy and test it through a series of Monte 
Carlo simulations. Simar and Wilson (2007) address concerns regarding the 
sensitivity of nonparametric frontier approach to outliers and to the inclusion of 
17
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stochastic noise, both of which are efficiently suppressed by the double-
bootstrapping technique (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004; Simar & Wilson, 2007). In 
short, bootstrapping allows for statistical inferences to be made within the domain 
of DEA, a traditionally nonparametric technique. 
 
This study suggests that the concept of performance may be extended to 
those measures that make up a composite evaluation of safety culture. The literature 
supports that by using a safety culture assessment instrument to gain performance 
inputs, DEA can be applied to form a mathematical model that estimates the 
efficiency of organizational safety culture with respect to peer organizations. By 
mitigating some of the limitations of traditional DEA and allowing for stochastic 
analysis, bootstrapped DEA is an appropriate and feasible methodological approach 
to the issue of benchmarking safety culture in aviation organizations taking into 
consideration the compounding effects of environmental determinants of 
efficiency. Further discussion along these lines is included in the results and 
conclusions that follow. 
 
Stochastic Model 
 
As an expansion of the previously discussed native DEA model, a stochastic 
form of the same is presented here following the methods outlined by Simar and 
Wilson (2007). To allow bootstrapping, an output-oriented DEA efficiency 
estimator must first be calculated as was illustrated by the linear programming 
model in equation 3. The efficiency estimator hereafter referred to as 𝛿𝑖, can now 
be used in a two-stage bootstrapping procedure. Even a cursory review of the 
relevant literature illustrates that in many cases of bootstrapping, a single bootstrap 
is utilized in conjunction with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of DEA 
estimates on covariates treated as environmental variables (Simar & Wilson, 2007). 
Equation 5 illustrates a common model by which this is accomplished. 
 
(5) 𝛿𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖      
  
This method presents a problem in that serial correlation is almost always 
present in DEA efficiency scores, given that calculating an efficiency estimate of 
one DMU necessarily requires an evaluation of all other DMUs in the subject set. 
This correlation renders normal regression analysis invalid. In addition, 
environmental variables as previously described are also correlated with the input 
and output variables used in the model, leading to biased results, especially in small 
sample sizes (Assaf & Josiassen, 2011). To circumvent these issues, the double 
bootstrap proves well suited. As outlined by Simar and Wilson (2007) and as in 
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Coelli, Perelman, and Romano (1999), Equation 6 represents a second-stage 
estimation to determine what factors contribute to variation in production 
efficiency. Size and accident rate for each DMU are proposed as appropriate 
environmental actors for second-stage estimation and analysis. 
 
(6) 𝛿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     
 
Where: 𝛿𝑖𝑡 represents the CCR DEA efficiency estimates, 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable wherein organizations of greater than 50 
employees, are represented by 1, otherwise, 0, 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the annual normalized accident rate, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is random error representing statistical noise as was included 
in the previously described native DEA model. 
 
This model, once populated with appropriate data, can then be double 
bootstrapped as described and first- and second-stage estimation values can, 
assuming that second-stage estimation variables conform to expectations of 
constant returns to scale, be evaluated by truncated regression (Barros & Dieke, 
2008; Simar & Wilson, 2007). In this way, a stochastic evaluation of the effect of 
the first- and second-stage may be evaluated in terms of both statistical and practical 
significance. 
 
Practical Implications 
 
In terms of practical implementation, it is intended that the results of the 
model presented here be used as a tool for identifying standardized practices as well 
as the most efficient use of limited resources earmarked for safety initiatives 
designed to improve safety culture. The absence of accidents, for instance, is not 
an absolute indicator of either effectiveness or efficiency, and the model presented 
in this study provides a more proactive, granular approach to the evaluation of 
particular safety-related initiatives in terms of the efficient use of finite resources 
toward a focus on the most effective interventions. Of interest in the model 
proposed here is to note to readers that efficiency and effectiveness may exist as 
separate constructs. Organizations G and J, as examples, are both operating 
efficiently, though their safety culture total scores, given in Table 4, are entirely 
different. This disparity is the impetus behind benchmarking of safety and 
illustrates the need for further empirical investigation of organizational factors 
contributing to safety. 
 
As a measure of efficiency improvement over time, this model allows an 
organization to evaluate how different budgetary allocation or cultural intervention 
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strategies affect actual output in terms of efficiency of use. At present, such 
evaluation of safety initiatives is generally poorly specified and as previously 
discussed is in large part based on forensic and imprecise measures such as accident 
rate. The double bootstrap procedure suggested herein allows for a more robust 
evaluation of estimation variables, including those related to technical, managerial, 
and environmental conditions. Reasoning counterfactually about the efficiency of 
safety investments, as this method allows, is a substantial step forward in not only 
understanding the role of organizational safety culture but in the purposeful 
maturation of culture. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 
As was discussed previously, native DEA techniques are particularly 
susceptible to errors in both measurements and in sampling. It is a deterministic 
technique, and as such is limited in that native DEA results cannot be extended to 
hypothesis testing. Instead, stochastic analysis must be achieved using individual 
input and output measures, and not the DEA results themselves. The results realized 
in this study are sufficient to inform the development of further models that may 
address the restrictions inherent to native DEA as a single-solution benchmarking 
tool. Further research would likely be best focused on the sequential model 
expansion proposed herein, and on potential means of counterfactual reasoning 
within such models. For example, the model presented here requires extensive 
validation of variable selection, a process that must require data unavailable within 
the scope of the present study. Results from this study could be used as points of 
comparison for future research as well, and along those lines, the present study 
would benefit from the availability of actual organization data.  
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